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Historical Development of the Law of Contracts to
Devise or Bequeath*
By BETuEL M. SP mKs**
As early as 1682 the validity of a contract to leave property
at death of the promisor was accepted without question., A feme
sole promised an heir at law, in consideration of his not suing to
evict her, that in case of her dying without issue she would either
give him a certain sum of money or leave him the land. The
feme sole later married and died, devising her land to her hus-
band.2 The promisee brought a bill against the husband and ob-
tained a decree directing that the husband convey the land to
the promisee and his heirs. The only objection offered was that
it was an agreement for a remainder after an estate tail, and that
such remainder was of no value.
The next reported case which has been found involving a
contract to leave property at death is Webster & Milford's Case
3
which involved a contract by a husband to leave one half of his
personalty to his wife. The validity of the contract was unques-
tioned. The dispute in the case was one concerning the interpre-
tation of the contract, the court holding that it was a contract to
leave the wife one half of the personalty existing at the time the
agreement was entered into rather than one half of what he
owned at death. In 1722 it was held that where one under a con-
tract to will an aliquot part of his estate attempts to defeat the
rights of his promisee by making inter vivos gifts, the gifts will be
set aside and the property permitted to pass in accordance with
the contractual obligation.4 In 1762 there appeared a case in-
* This article is based upon a section of a thesis written in partial fulfillment
of requirements for the S.J.D. degree at the University of Michigan Law School.
** B.S., Eastern Kentucky State College; LL.B., University of Kentucky;
LL.M., University of Michigan. Associate Professor of Law, New York University;
Editor, Ksaruc LAw JounNAL, 1948.
Goilmere v. Battison, 1 Vern. 48, 23 Eng. Rep. 301 (1682).
Of course at this time a married woman could not devise land to her hus-
band. Just bow the result was accomplished in this case is not at all clear, but an
editor's note to the case in Eng. Rep. indicates that she probably executed her will
prior to marriage.
2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 362, 22 Eng. Rep. 308 (1708).
'Gregor v. Kemp, 3 Swanst. 482, note, 36 Eng. Rep. 926 (1722).
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volving a contract to leave by will a sum of money or an annuity
to the promisor's housekeeper. 5 The will was not made and re-
covery in assumpsit was allowed against the personal representa-
tive of the promisor. The only question raised as to the enforce-
ability of the contract was whether or not it was within the Statute
of Frauds as a contract not to be performed within a year.
In spite of the rarity with which these cases found their way
into the early reports, the failure of the courts in almost every
instance in which they did arise to even discuss the question of
possible invalidity on the ground that a contract to leave prop-
erty at death is void tends toward the conclusion that such con-
tracts were probably in rather general use from the very begin-
ning of the common law. It can at least be said that when they
first began to appear in the reported cases they were not suffi-
ciently out of harmony with the then existing legal concepts to
arouse any doubts in the minds of the bar of that period. By
1797 a statement is found in an argument of counsel that, "No
proposition is better settled than that a contract to leave by will
is good."' The meager accounts of these early cases are not suf-
ficient to inform us of the theory on which they were decided,
and that question appears to have constituted somewhat of a
puzzle to the courts ever since. It is clear that contracts to leave
property at death were given legal effect, but as to just what that
effect was these early cases are not so articulate. There is room
for doubt as to whether the contract operated upon the will of the
promisor or whether it was merely a property transfer or at least
a contract for a transfer at a future time.7
'Fenton v. Emblers, 3 Burr. 1278, 97 Eng. Rep. 831 (1762).
'Walpole v. Orford, 3 Ves. Jun. 402, 412, 30 Eng. Rep. 1076, 1081 (1797).
It is significant that in none of these early cases was there any discussion of
any possible conflict between the propositions announced and the provisions of the
Wills Act, nor was there any indication that the court in any of the cases con-
sidered the problem as involving a question of the law of wills. In the case of
Goilmere v. Battison, 1 Vern. 48, 23 Eng. Rep. 301 (1682) the contract was to
leave at death. There was no promise as to the method of leaving nor did the
court discuss that particular point, apparently considering it immaterial. The
report in Webster & Milford's Case, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 862, 22 Eng. Rep. 308
(1708) is very meager, but it clearly indicates a theory of the distribution of
property in accordance with a contract without any consideration of testamentary
law. In Gregor v. Kemp, 3 Swanst. 482, hote, 36 Eng. Rep. 926 (1722), although
a will had been executed pursuant to the covenant, claim was made and enforced
under the covenant, and there was no indication of a feeling that the will had
created any rights in the promisee. In Fenton v. Emblers, 3 Burr. 1278, 97 Eng.
Rep. 831 (1762) the contract was to leave by will, but in allowing the action
'against the personal representative the court did not purport to be enforcing a will.
CONTmAcrS TO DEVISE
In 1769 in the case of Dufour v. Pereira8 the courts were faced
with what appeared to be a new type of instrument, a joint will9
made pursuant to contract between the parties. So unusual was
such a case that Lord Camden was struck "more from the novelty
of the thing than its difficulty." 10 A husband and wife executed a
joint will with a contract not to revoke."' The husband died and
the will was probated as his will, the wife taking the benefit
thereunder. Thereafter the wife undertook to revoke the will and
make a different disposition of her property. At her death the
legatees under the joint will brought their bill in equity to de-
termine their right to the property involved. A decree was
granted directing that the property be distributed in accordance
with the joint will.12 Dufour v. Pereira appears to be the first re-
ported case which attempted to give any indication of the theory
of the relief granted, and although it clearly appears from Har-
They treated the matter more as an ordinary claim against the estate of the
deceased.
'1 Dick. 419, 21 Eng. Rep. 332 (1769).
"At this time there was no established concept of "joint will," and there is
such a diversity of definitions that it is doubtful if we can now say that there is
such an "established concept." If it is considered as an instrument of joint opera-
tion such as a deed or contract executed by joint grantors or joint obligors, there is
no such thing known to the law. However, as used here, and as will be used
throughout this paper a joint will is nothing more than the wills of two or more
persons expressed on one piece of paper and executed as a will by each of them.
See Curry v. Cotton, 356 Ill. 538, 543, 191 N.E. 307, 309 (1934) and American
Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Eckhardt, 331 Ill. 261, 264, 162 N.E. 843, 845 (1928).
Whether or not there is a contract between the parties or whether or not the wills
are reciprocal in the sense that each testator names the other as beneficiary will be
considered immaterial for purposes of usage herein. It might be noted that the
term "joint will" has sometimes been given a much more restricted meaning.
Some cases have considered wills joint only in cases where they purported to dis-
pose of joint property. Hall v. Roberts, 146 Fla. 444, 446, 1 S. 2d 579, 580 (1941);
Deseumeur v. Rondel, 76 N.J. Eq. 394, 399, 74 AtI. 703, 705 (1909). Others
have ignored the joint property requirement but have applied the term -only
where there was a gift to third persons, not merely a gift by the testators to each
other. Ginn v. Edmundson, 173 N.C. 85, 91 S.E. 696 (1917); In re Cole's Will,
171 N.C. 74, 87 S.E. 962 (1916).
" Dufour v. Pereira, 1 Dick. 419, 420, 21 Eng. Rep. 332, 333 (1769).
' The evidence by which the contract was proved, or even the existence of a
contract, seems doubtful from Dickens' report of the case. However, in a sub-
sequent case Lord Chancellor Loughborough, who was counsel in the Dufour
case, said the following: "The bill stated an agreement in writing contained in
an instrument conceived in the form of a will of persons not conversant in the
laws of this kingdom, made before a notary public; an agreement perfectly de-
fined with minuteness upon all cases, that could be supposed to occur." Walpole
v. Orford, 3 Ves. Jun. 402, 416, 30 Eng. Rep. 1076, 1083 (1797).
" The type of relief sought and the nature of the decree granted is not
clearly indicated in Dickens' report, but there is a fuller report of the case in 2
HARGRAVE, JUlsCoNSuLT E-ERCITATIONS 99 (1811) and it is that report that is
here relied upon.
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grave's report that Lord Camden considered the contract as bind-
ing the promisor's assets and having no effect upon the subsequent
will as such,13 the report furnished by Dickens is so meager that
this case has been a constant source of confusion both as to the
law concerning contracts to devise or bequeath and the law of
joint wills.14
A reading of Dickens' report without a careful consideration
of the facts of the case and without examining other sources of
information would lead one to believe that Lord Camden held
that a will made pursuant to contract was, at least after complete
performance by the promisee, an irrevocable instrument. It was
there stated:
It might have been revoked by both jointly; it might
have been revoked separately, provided the party intending
it, had given notice to the other of such revocation. But I
cannot be of opinion, that either of them, could, during
their joint lives, do it secretly; or that after death of either,
it could be done by the survivor by another will.15
Although the above is most likely an inaccurate, or at least an
incomplete, statement of the opinion,1" it is probably the source
of much of the difficulty concerning any analysis of the nature of
the legal relations arising out of contracts to devise or bequeath.
It brings into focus some of the inherent and essential distinctions
between a contract and a will and suggests the question whether
or not the expression "contract to make a will" is a contradiction
of terms, and, if not, what relations are created by such a trans-
action.
A will is a "means whereby one disposes of his property at his
death or appoints an executor or a guardian for his orphan child
or does any combination of these things." 1 The important words
' In Hargrave's report of the case the following statement is found: "Though
a will is always revocable, and the last must always be the testator's will; yet a
man may so bind his assets by agreement, that his will shall be a trustee for the
performance of his agreement." 2 HARORA E, op. cit. supra note 12, at 105.
""The law upon the subject has been in a state of confusion since July 18,
1769, when Lord Chancellor Camden pronounced judgment in the case of Dufour
v. Pereira...." Menke v. Duwe, 117 Kan. 207, 214, 280 Pac. 1065, 1068 (1924).
" Dufour v. Pereira, 1 Dick. 419, 420-421, 21 Eng. Rep. 832, 333 (1769).
" It is certainly in conflict with Hargrave's report. See note 13 supra.
' Bordwell, Testamentary Dispositions, 19 Ky. L. J. 283 (1931).
While it is clearly recognized that definitions are often treacherous in that
they are rarely ever sufficiently "inclusive" and "exclusive" to provide for all
situations, it is believed that Professor Bordwells definition is satisfactory for most
purposes. Blackstone defined a will as "the legal declaration of a man's intentions,
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in this definition are "at his death.""' In order that the instrument
in question may be considered a will it is essential that none of
the testator's property be bound in any way before his death and
that the testator have a complete and absolute power of revoca-
tion. As will subsequently appear there is modem authority to
the effect that a will can be made irrevocable, but this was
definitely not the view of the early writers on the subject. When
contracts to devise or bequeath were first making their appear-
ance in the law it was universally recognized that these two con-
cepts, ineffectiveness until death and absolute power of revoca-
tion, were both necessary to complete the concept of a will. No
utterance can be found prior to the case of Dufour v. Pereira
which, by implication or otherwise, gives any indication that a
will is possible without these two essential characteristics. So
essential did Swinburne consider the freedom of altering one's
testament as often as he chose that he said that "a man may as
oft as he will make a new testament, even until his last breath"
and that there was nothing "under the sun to prevent this
liberty."19
which he wills to be performed after his death." 2 BLACKSTONE, COlNMENTAIMES
ON rm LAW OF ENGLAND 499-500 (1766). Swinburne said, "A last will is a
lawful disposing of that which any would have done after death." SwNHUMNE,
WiLLS pt. 1, see. 4 (1590). A more elaborate, though less satisfactory, definition
is that given by Jarman that, "A will is an instrument by which a person makes a
disposition of his property to take effect after his decease, and which is, in its own
nature, ambulatory and revocable during his life." 1 JAnmAN, WILLS 26 (8th ed.
1951). Jarman's definition is defective in at least two respects. A will is not
necessarily an "instrument" where nuncupative wills are recognized and a will
does not necessarily make a disposition of property. 1 PAGE, WiLLS sec. 47 (Life-
time ed. 1941).
" This quality of being ineffective until death of the testator is often described
by saying that the will is "ambulatory." Innis v. Mich. Trust Co., 238 Mich. 282,
213 N.W. 85 (1927); Starks v. Lincoln, 316 Mo. 483, 291 S.W. 132 (1927);
Hattersley v. Bissett, 50 N.J. Eq. 577, 25 At. 332 (1892); Gridley v. Gates, 228
App. Div. 579, 240 N.Y. Supp. 260 (1930); Dixon v. Dixon, 191 Okla. 139, 126
P. 2d 1020 (1942). However, the word ambulatory has been used to mean that
the will disposes of property which the testator acquired after the making of the
will as well as before the making of the will. 2 POLLOCK & MArrL , Hisrony OF
ENGLiSH LAW 315 (2d ed. 1911). When used in this paper the word ambulatory
will be taken to include both these qualities, i.e., (1) that the will has no effect
whatever until the death of the testator, and (2) that when the will does take
effect it is capable of disposing of any property owned by the testator at the time
of his death regardless of the time of acquisition.
"SwNuBRNE, Wn.is 263 (1590).
"... so if I make my testament and last will irrevocable, yet I may revoke it,
for my act or my words cannot alter the judgment of the law to make that ir-
revocable, which is of its own nature revocable." Vynior's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 81b,
82a, 77 Eng. Rep. 597, 600 (1610).
"The making of a will is but the inception of it, and it doth not take any
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Can there be such a thing as a contract to perform a revocable
and ineffective act? A contract cannot exist without there being
a legal obligation on the part of the promisor.2" If there can be
such a thing as a contract to make a will of a particular tenor, it
necessarily follows that there is a legal obligation to make a will
of that tenor. But if that will does not affect any property or have
any legal effect at all until the testator's death and the testator
can revoke the instrument with impunity at any time before
death, it would appear that the legal obligation to make it would
be rather meaningless.
This apparent clash of concepts does not appear in any of the
legal literature prior to the statement by Lord Camden that he
could not be of the opinion that one party to a joint will made
pursuant to contract could revoke it after the death of the other
party.21 Of course if this statement were considered in connection
with that part of Lord Camden's statement reported by Hargrave
in which it was said, "Though a will is always revocable, and the
last must always be the testator's will; yet a man may so bind
his assets by agreement, that his will shall be a trustee for the
performance of his agreement,"" it would be clear that the real
meaning of the case was that it was the property that was bound
by the contract and that the revocation or non-revocation of the
will was immaterial. However, it was Dickens', and not Har-
effect till the death of the devisor, for . . then it would be against the nature
of a will to be so absolute, that he who makes it, being of good and perfect
memory, cannot countramand it .. " Forse & Hembling's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 60b,
61b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1022, 1023-1024 (1588).
"A will is . . . in its own nature ambulatory and revocable" during the life
of the testator. 1 JmmiAN, Wuas 12 (2d Am. ed. 1849).
"It is also a peculiar property in a will.., that by its nature it is in all cases
a revocable instrument...." Wn.LIA-s, ExEcuToas AND ADNmaSTRAToas 9
(1832).
It should be noted that in each of these early declarations there is expressed
the doctrine that the will is inherently, of its own nature, and by definition a
revocable instrument. It is not a mere formal rule of law, but a part of the
meaning of the concept itself.
'A contract has been defined as "the legal relations between persons arising
from a voluntary expression of intention, and including at least one primary right
in personam, actual or potential, with its corresponding duty." Corbin, Offer and
Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations, 26 YA.E L. J. 169, 170
(1917).
Professor Williston has defined a contract as "a promise, or set of promises,
for breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law
in some way recognizes as a duty." 1 WmLiSTON, CoNTraAcTs 1 (Rev. ed. 1936).
'Dufour v. Pereira, 1 Dick. 419, 420-421, 21 Eng. Rep. 332, 333 (1769),
cited supra note 15.
"See note 13 supra.
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grave's, report that was before most of the subsequent courts
handling the subject and the law that has developed is far from
clear. In considering subsequent development it should always
be kept in mind that in the Dufour case the contract and the will
were both expressed in a single writing. Thus, there was on one
piece of paper the will of two persons together with a contract
between those persons. Under such circumstances what was
meant when it was said that the writing was irrevocable? The
writing itself was nothing more than so much ink and paper. It
was evidence of a legal relationship or of legal relationships of
some kind. It was those relationships that were or were not
revocable. It is probable that the mere fact that these entirely
separate concepts were expressed on the same piece of paper,
concerned the same persons and the same property, and were
designed to accomplish the same result has been the reason for
the doubts concerning the true meaning of the case.
It is unfortunate that the question of the joint will became
entangled in the law concerning wills made for a consideration
before the legal effect of the latter became clearly defined. Only
six years after the decision in the Dufour case Lord Mansfield
remarked, "Now there cannot be a joint will., 23 The Dufour case
was not referred to by Mansfield, nor does it appear from the
opinion whether his statement was intended as a proposition of
law or merely as a statement that a joint will could not accomplish
the result which was sought in the case with which he was con-
cerned. In either event he surely could not have intended that a
contract to leave property by will was not enforceable for he had
sustained just such a contract thirteen years earlier.24
In Jones v. Martin5 it was held in the House of Lords that a
contract to leave a child an equal portion with other children pre-
vented the promisor from favoring the other children with inter
vivos gifts made under an informal arrangement by which he
continued to receive the income from the property until his death.
Although an opposite result had been reached in the Court of
' Darlington v. Pulteney, I Cowp. 260, 268, 98 Eng. Rep. 1075, 1079 (1775).
" Fenton v. Emblers, 3 Burr. 1278, 97 Eng. Rep. 831 (1762).
' 6 B.P.C. 437, 2 Eng. Rep. 1184, 5 Ves. Jun. 276, note, 31 Eng. Rep. 582
(1798), reversing, Jones v. Martin, 3 Anst. 882, 145 Eng. Rep. 1070 (1797). The
case was followed in an almost identical situation in Fortescue v. Hennai, 19 Ves.
Jun. 67, 34 Eng. Rep. 443 (1812).
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Exchequer, 0 the decision there had been based upon a construc-
tion of the contract and not upon any theory that the contract as
such was invalid. The manner in which the case was presented
even in the lower court indicates that emphasis was placed upon
the effect the contract might have upon the property itself.ar In
Walpole v. Orford" a will alleged to have been made pursuant to
a contract not to revoke was revoked by a subsequent will. The
court refused to give effect to the trusts established by the prior
will, but the decision is based solely upon the ground that the
contract was uncertain and not sufficiently established by the
evidence, thus leaving unchallenged the general proposition that
a contract to leave property by will is valid.
In Hobson v. Blackburn29 the court was confronted with a
will very similar to that in the Dufour case but the question arose
in an entirely different manner. Instead of a proceeding in equity
to establish the rights under the contract expressed in a joint will,
this was an attempt to probate the joint will as the will of one of
the parties who had subsequently revoked it as her will. In deny-
ing probate Sir John Nicholl declared that such an instrument:
* * * is unknown to the testamentary law of this
country; or, in other words,... it is unknown as a will, to
the law of this country at all. It may for aught that I know,
be valid as a compact-it may be operative, in equity, to the
extent of making the devisees of the will trustees for per-
forming the deceased's part of the compact. But these are
considerations wholly foreign to this Court, which looks to
the instrument entitled to probate as the deceased's will and
to that only. The allegation plainly proceeds upon a notion
of the irrevocability of the instrument which it propounds
as the will of the deceased. Why this very circumstance
destroys its essence as a will, and converts it into a contract;
a species of instrument over which this court has no jurisdic-
tion.3
0
Although Sir John Nicholl made it clear that all he was doing
was refusing to probate a will which had been subsequently re-
Jones v. Martin, 8 Anst, 882, 145 Eng. Rep. 1070 (1797).
2 Counsel argued that the contract "gave the plaintiffs a vested interest in
the property, which could not be divested by the covenantor or volunteers under
him." Jones v. Martin, 8 Anst. 882, 886, 145 Eng. Rep. 1070, 1071 (1797).
8 Ves. Jun. 402, 30 Eng. Rep. 1076 (1797).
11 Add. 274, 162 Eng. Rep. 96 (1822).
Hobson v. Blackburn, 1 Add. 274, 277-279, 162 Eng. Rep. 96, 97-98
(1822).
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yoked by the testatrix, and that the effect of a contract expressed
in the prior will was not considered, subsequent cases did not
always observe this distinction. The theory developed that if two
or more persons expresed their wills together in the same writing
and also included in that writing a contract not to revoke the wills,
the wills themselves were ipso facto void as wills. Even the early
commentators, although recognizing that a joint will might be en-
forced as a compact, denied its existence as a will and gave as a
reason the irrevocability of such an instrument.3 1 The fact that
in the principal case relied upon, Hobson v. Blackburn, the will
had been probated as the will of one of the parties who had not
attempted to revoke was apparently lost sight of.
In the first reported case that has been found in the United
States involving a contract to make a will, the validity of such a
contract was accepted without question,3 2 and was again upheld
a few years later in a contract between husband and wife.33
Probably one of the earliest American cases to give serious at-
tention to a joint will was Clayton v. Liverman.34 The court com-
pletely ignored the prior cases of contracts to leave by will and
denied probate largely because of the existence of what was at
most an implied contract. Two sisters had executed one piece of
paper purporting to dispose of their separate property in a com-
mon manner without clearly distinguishing between the separate
ownership. The parties died within a few days of each other
and the writing was offered for probate both as the joint will of
both of them and the individual will of each of them. Probate
was refused, largely in reliance upon Hobson v. Blackburn3 5 and
Darlington v. Pulteney. Neither party had ever attempted to
" 1 JAMUAN, WILLS 27 (2d Am. ed. 1849); 1 WILLImuS, ExEcUTroRs AND
ADNISTrAToRs 9 (1832).
' Izard v. Middleton, 1 Desaus. 116 (S.C. 1785) (relief in the particular case
denied, however, on the ground that the contract, being oral, was unenforceable
under the Statute of Frauds).
'Rivers v. Rivers, 3 Desaus. 190 (S.C. 1811).
19 N.C. 558 (1837).
1 Add. 274, 162 Eng. Rep. 96 (1822). This was an attempt to probate a
joint will as the will of a testatrix who bad executed a subsequent revocation. It
cannot in any, sense be said to be controlling where there had been no attempted
revocation. In fact, the will involved had been previously probated as the will of
a testator who had made no attempt to revoke, and the validity of that probate
was apparently unquestioned.
'1 Cowp. 260, 98 Eng. Rep. 1075 (1775). This case merely held that a
power in twro persons and the survivor of them, exercisable by their deed or deeds,
was not properly exercised by the will of the survivor. By the terms of the power
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revoke the will, but the court was of the opinion that the mere
attempt to execute such a will made it irrevocable as a will and
therefore void.37 It has been suggested that even though it should
be held that the contract not to revoke was of no legal effect, its
mere existence would constitute a sufficient moral barrier to re-
vocation to invalidate the will.38 This confusion of contractual
and testamentary principles led to a theory that it was necessary
either to hold that contracts to devise or bequeath were without
effect or that a will could be made irrevocable by contract.
Three years prior to the decision in Clayton v. Liverman the
Supreme Court of Maine had before it a joint will executed by a
husband and wife as joint makers. 9 The husband predeceased
the wife, and when it was shown that the property of which the
instrument purported to dispose was his exclusively, the docu-
ment was admitted to probate as his will. The reasoning of the
court appeared to be to the effect that since the wife had no
property on which the will could operate her signature was mere
surplusage and did not affect the will of the husband.40 The will
was joint in form but necessarily separate in operation and freely
revocable by the husband during his life; consequently, it was not
within the supposed ban against joint wills. This case represented
the beginning of a distinction between (1) a will joint in form
but necessarily the will of only one of the parties and unencum-
bered by any contractual obligation and (2) a will joint in form and
purporting to dispose of property of two or more persons and in-
volving a contract on the part of one or both not to revoke. Thus, the
doctrine developed that a will joint in form but purporting to
dispose of only the property of the first to die in favor of the
survivor, without any valid contract between them and without
if it had been exercised during the lives of the two persons it was required to be
exercised by them jointly. It was argued that since a will could not have a joint
operation, exercise of the power by wll was not contemplated by the creator of
the power, and it was in this sense that Lord Mansfield's statement that there
could not be a joint will was made, and on this point he is undoubtedly right.T'his view seems to have resulted from the influence of Jarman and Wil-
liams. See note 1 supra. These writers made an improper application of Darling-
ton v. Pulteney and gave more attention to the dictum than 
the decision in
Hobson v. Blackburn.
See also: Hershy v. Clark, 85 Ark. 17 (1879); Walker v. Walker, 14 Ohio St.
157 (1862).am alker v. Walker, 14 Ohio St. 157 (1862).
aogers, Appellant, 11 Me. 803 (1884).
Tsame proposition was adopted in Allen v. Allen, 28 Kan. 18 (1882).
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any effort to control the property after the decease of the first to
die, was a valid testamentary disposition and could be probated
as a will;41 but that if the instrument was joint in form and pur-
ported to dispose of the property to third persons, or was based
on a valid contract between the parties, it was not a valid testa-
mentary disposition of anybody and could not be admitted to
probate although never revoked by the testators or by any one of
them.42 It seems strange that such a distinction43 should be made
at a time when a contract to make an ordinary will (not a joint
will) was recognized, apparently without question, as binding
and enforceable both in England44 and in the United States.45
The result reached was that, although both joint wills and wills
made for consideration were clearly within established legal
principles, the two united in one instrument became an impos-
sibility. The courts following this view in the joint will cases did
so on the theory that a joint will made pursuant to an agreement
between the parties to it was in effect an irrevocable will, at least
as to the survivor, and that irrevocable wills were impossible.
The commentators of the day found it difficult to distinguish the
revocable feature of an instrument of this type from the revocable
feature of any kind of will made for a consideration. As a result
they often reached the conclusion that recognition of the validity
of a contract to leave property by will necessarily entailed a recog-
nition of the possibility of an irrevocable will.
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1 Lewis v. Scofield, 26 Conn. 452 (1857); Evans v. Smith, 28 Ga. 98 (1859).
" Hershy v. Clark, 85 Ark. 17 (1879); Clayton v. Liverman, 19 N.C. 558
(1837); Walker v. Walker, 14 Ohio St. 157 (1862).
" Some courts refused to recognize the distinction and held that the existence
of the contract was immaterial, and that the will in either type of case was valid
as a proper instrument for probate if it had not been actually revoked. Ex parte
Day, 1 Bradf. 476 (N.Y., 1851); see Schumaker v. Schmidt, 44 Ala. 454 (1870).
It is quite improbable that the distinction was ever recognized in England. Goods
of Stracey, 1 Deane 6, 164 Eng. Rep. 484 (1855).
" Maddison v. Alderson, 8 App. Cas. 467 (1883) (enforcement refused, how-
ever, because of difficulty with the Statute of Frauds); Caton v. Caton, 1865, L.R.,
1 Cb. 137 (enforcement refused, however, because of difficulty with the Statute of
Frauds); Loffus v. Maw, 3 Giff. 592, 66 Eng. Rep. 544 (1862); Fenton v.
Emblers, 8 Burr. 1278, 97 Eng. Rep. 831 (1762); Goilmere v. Battison, 1 Vein.
48, 28 Eng. Rep. 301 (1682).
"Gould v. Mansfield, 103 Mass. 408 (1869); Anding v. Davis, 38 Miss. 574
(1860); Bynum v. Bynum, 33 N.C. 632 (1850); Rivers v. Rivers, 3 Desaus. 190
(S.C. 1811); Izard v. Middleton, 1 Desaus. 116 (S.C. 1785).
""Hence there is here in effect a case of an irrevocable will, whether the
agreement be carried out or not. It may then be doubted if revocability is so es-
sential to the validity of a will as is commonly believed." 1 JAWur-UN, W.Ls 18,
n. 1 (5th Am. ed. 1881). It is interesting to note that in his earlier editions Jar-
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It was not until the above mentioned development had taken
place that the problem of wills made for a consideration became
prominent in reported cases. As these cases began to arise in
quantity47 the courts found themselves faced with the following
situation: (1) on the few occasions in which the problem had
arisen in the early cases, the validity of contracts to devise or
bequeath had been accepted without question and without any
adequate discussion of the problem;48 (2) it had been held that
such contracts, when involved in joint wills, rendered the wills
invalid as attempts to make irrevocable wills;49 (8) joint wills had
been sustained where no contractual obligation had been in-
volved;50 and (4) in spite of the previously well established con-
cept of a will as a revocable and ambulatory instrument, the
commentators were referring to wills made pursuant to contract
as examples of irrevocable wills.5 The problem was further con-
fused by the development of ordinary commercial contracts with
the time for performance determined by the death of the promi-
sor. Prior to 1900 it was established that such contracts, whether
to be performed at death 2 or within a specified time after death1
3
were valid, and their validity was apparently not affected by the
fact that they were made for the express purpose of avoiding the
Wills Act. 4 Looking backward it might appear difficult to see
man had declared without qualification that wills were of their own nature re-
vocable and ambulatory. 1 JAmRAN, Wrens 12 (2d Am. ed. 1842).
"It is settled in the courts of chancery, by a great number of decisions, that
mutual wills, duly executed, become irrevocable, in equity, after the death of
either party to them." REDFiDz, WILLS 183 (1864).
"But a will may be made upon valuable consideration in special instances;
and if so, the disposition is no longer in the nature of a gift and gratuitous. Is it
then irrevocable . . .? As a matter of legal principle, then, we must admit that
there may be in effect wills revocable and wills irrevocable.... ScaoUIER,
WiLLs sec. 452 (1887).
" Very few cases involving contracts to devise or bequeath can be found prior
to 1850, comparatively few from 1850 to 1875, but literally hundreds of them
since 1875.
8 Rivers v. Rivers, 3 Desaus. 190 (S.C. 1811); Izard v. Middleton, 1 Desaus.
116 (S.C. 1785); Fenton v. Emblers, 3 Burr. 1278, 97 Eng. Rep. 831 (1762);
Goilmere v. Battison, 1 Vein. 48, 23 Eng. Rep. 301 (1682).
" Hershy v. Clark, 35 Ark. 17 (1879); Clayton v. Liverman, 19 N.C. 558
(1837); Walker v. Walker, 14 Ohio St. 157 (1862).
' Lewis v. Scofield, 26 Conn. 452 (1857); Evans v. Smith, 28 Ga. 98 (1859);
Rogers, Appellant, 11 Me. 303 (1834).
'See note 46 supra.
'Parker v. Coburn, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 82 (1865).
' Price v. Jones, 105 Ind. 543, 5 N.E. 683 (1886); Krell v. Codman, 154
Mass. 454, 28 N.E. 578 (1891); Hegeman v. Moon, 131 N.Y. 462, 30 N.E. 487
(1892); Carnwright v. Gray, 127 N.Y. 92, 27 N.E. 835 (1891).
' See Krell v. Codman, 154 Mass. 454, 458, 28 N.E. 578 (1891). If the in-
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why contracts to devise or bequeath should have been considered
different from contracts to pay over at death, but such was not
always the view of the courts dealing with the subject. The con-
tract to pay over was considered as being on the same basis as
any other contract to be performed at a fixed future time, the
only peculiarity being that the time of performance was de-
termined by the death of the promisor rather than by some other
definite event that could have been chosen. Rights under the
contract were fixed and determined when the contract was made.
When the contract involved the making of a will as the manner
of performance, the fixed contractual obligation appeared to
clash with the inherent ambulatory nature of a will. Somehow it
was felt that the will necessarily became a part of the contract.
In the midst of these poorly defined and apparently conflicting
views, it is little wonder that the various courts dealing with the
nature of the relationship created by a contract to make a will
reached widely varying results.
Some courts reasoned that the right to change one's will was
as much a subject of contract as any other right, and that one
could effectively dispose of the right if he chose. 5 By voluntarily
disposing of the right to change a will he established the prior
will as his last legal will and became unconditionally bound
thereby. Any argument to the contrary has been dubbed insist-
ence upon mere form and a blind effort to preserve the concept
of a will as an ambulatory instrument. 6 On the other hand it
was argued that private contracts could not alter the nature of
what the law deemed a testamentary act.57 It was said that a man
could dispose of his property when he chose, that he could bind
himself to dispose of it at any particular future time, including
strument were in the form of a mere promise to make a gift at death or a direction
to one's executor to pay over it could not be enforced unless executed as a will.
Johnston v. Griest, 85 Ind. 503 (1882); Cover v. Stem, 67 Md. 449, 10 Atl. 231
(1887).
'8This seems to be the reasoning of Frazier v. Patterson, 243 Ill. 80, 90 N.E.
216 (1909). See also: Rolls v. Allen, 204 Calif. 604, 607, 269 Pac. 450, 451-452
(1928); Lovett v. Lovett, 87 Ind. App. 42, 155 N.E. 528, rehearing denied, 87
Ind. App. 42, 52, 157 N.E. 104 (1927); Brown v. Webster, 90 Neb. 591, 603, 134
N.W. 185, 190 (1912); Johnson v. Hubbell, 10 N.J. Eq. (2 Stockton) 332, 335
(1855); Rivers v. Rivers, 3 Desaus. 190 (S.C. 1811).
Goddard, Mutual Wils, 17 Mica. L. Rayv. 677, 686 (1919).
" ... so if I make my testament and last will irrevocable, yet I may revoke
it, for my act or my words cannot alter the judgment of the lav to make that ir-
revocable, which is of its own nature revocable." Vynior's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 81b,
82a, 77 Eng. Rep. 597, 600 (1610).
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the time of his death, but that the moment he became bound,
he had entered into a legal relation which was not a will, what-
ever else it might be called.5s
Throughout its development the law as to the revocability of
the will made pursuant to contract and the status of the property
from the making of the contract until the death of the promisor
has been in a constant state of confusion. Here as elsewhere in
the law there has often been discrepancy between what the courts
have done and what they have said, and the commentators have
often been as prone to accept what they have said as they have
what they have done. In 1887 it was held in the Supreme Court
of Alabama59 that where there is a valid contract to leave prop-
erty by will and a will is made pursuant to that contract, if the
promisor makes an inconsistent will, the beneficiaries of the sub-
sequent will can be held constructive trustees for the benefit of
the beneficiaries of the will made pursuant to the contract.
Although the court made it clear that this was the type of relief
granted,60 they made the further unnecessary and unfortunate
statement that:
All the authorities agree that one may, for a valuable
consideration, renounce the absolute power to dispose of
his estate at pleasure, and bind himself by contract to dis-
pose of his property by will to a particular person, and that
such contract may be enforced in the courts after his de-
cease, either by an action for its breach against his personal
representative, or, in a proper case, by bill in the nature of
specific performance against his heirs, devisees, or personal
representative. 6'
"It is possible that a system of law might be imagined in which a will was
irrevocable and yet passed no interest during the lifetime of the testator; but this
is not the way that we think or talk about the legal institution of the will....
If the instrument executed is such that the maker can not revoke it, it may be a
deed, a contract, and the like, but it can not be a will. And on the other hand,
if the instrument is a will, it is revocable." PAGE, WLLs see. 71 (Lifetime ed.
1941).
"If the instrument is irrevocable we ought not to apply to it the term 'will,'
a term definitely appropriated to an important instrument with special legal
characteristics, one of which is that it should not be irrevocable during the life-
time of the testator. Whether this is a conveyance, a power of appointment, or a
contract enforced by refusing probate to a later instrument, it should not be called
a will." Note, Testamentary Contracts and Irrevocable Wills, 27 YALE L. J. 542,
546, n. 13 (1918).
' Bolman v, Overall, 80 Ala. 451, 2 So. 624 (1887).
'The court stated, '"The courts do not set aside the will in such cases, but
the executor, heir, or devisee is made a trustee to perform the contract." Bolman
v. Overall, 80 Ala. 451, 456, 2 So. 624, 626 (1887).
Bolman v. Overall, 80 Ala. 451, 455, 2 So. 624, 626 (1887).
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It is difficult to determine from the words used just what is
meant by the declaration that one may "renounce the absolute
power to dispose of his estate at pleasure," but the fact remains
that these words have often been seized upon as a basis for the
doctrine that a will may be made irrevocable by contract, a propo-
sition which does not appear to have been applied in the de-
cision."' With the theory that a will made pursuant to contract
was an irrevocable will conflicting with the traditional concept of
a will as a revocable instrument, there was doubt for a time dur-
ing the 19th century as to the validity of contracts to devise or
bequeath in any form. The result was that while the validity of
such contracts became well established, 3 the nature of the rela-
tion created by them remained in confusion.
A will made pursuant to contract has been held so far ir-
revocable that if a subsequent revoking will should be admitted
' More recent Alabama cases have emphasized that the contractual right
acquired by the promisee does not affect and is not dependent upon the revoc-
ability of the will. Merchants National Bank of Mobile v. Cotnam, 250 Ala. 316,
34 So. 2d 122 (1948).
That a contract to leave property by will is too clearly recognized to re-
quire citation of authority the following quotations, from among many which
could have been selected, may be considered: "The rule is well established in this
state that it is competent for a person owning property to make a contract to dis-
pose of it by will in a particular way, and that such a contract, when based upon
a sufficient consideration and clearly established, will be enforced in equity."
Oswald v. Nehls, 233 II. 438, 443, 84 N.E. 619, 621 (1908). "That it is com-
petent for a party to stipulate for the disposition of his property at the time of
his decease is too well settled to admit of doubt or question." Jenkins v. Stetson,
91 Mass. (9 Allen) 128, 132 (1864). "It is well established that it is competent
for the owner of property to make a contract with another person to bequeath the
same to that person at the death of the owner." Kelley v. Devin, 65 Ore. 211,
215, 132 Pac. 535, 536 (1913).
A few of the more recent cases recognizing the validity of such contracts
are Bolander v. Godsil, 116 F. 2d 437 (9th Cir. 1940); Moumal v. Walsh, 9
Alaska 656 (1940); Mau v. McManaman, 29 Calif. App. 2d 631, 85 P. 2d 209
(1938); Estate of Doerfer, 100 Colo. 304, 67 P. 2d 492 (1937); McDowell v.
Ritter, 153 Fla. 50, 13 S. 2d 612 (1943); Cagle v. Justus, 196 Ga. 826, 28 S.E.
2d 255 (1943); Anson v. Haywood, 397 Ill. 370, 74 N.E. 2d 489 (1947);
Lawrence v. Ashba, 115 Ind. App. 485, 59 N.E. 2d 568 (1945); DeJong v. Huyser,
233 Iowa 1315, 11 N.W. 2d 566 (1943); Child v. Smith, 255 Iowa 1205, 282
N.W. 316 (1938); Matter of the Estate of Adkins, 161 Kan. 239, 167 P. 2d 618
(1946); Bray v. Cooper, 145 Kan. 642, 66 P. 2d 592 (1937); Farmers Nat. Bank
of Danville, Ky. v. Young, 297 Ky. 95, 179, S.W. 2d 229 (1944); Nichols v. Reed,
186 Md. 317, 46 A. 2d 695 (1946); McDonald v. Scheifler, 323 Mich. 117, 34
N.W. 2d 573 (1948); Downing v. Maag, 215 Minn. 506, 10 N.W. 2d 778 (1943);
Adams v. Moberg, 356 Mo. 1175, 205 S.W. 2d 553 (1947); Hackensack Trust Co.
v. Ackerman, 138 N.J. Eq. (37 Backes) 244, 47 A. 2d 832 (1946); Halsey v.
Snell, 214 N.C. 209, 198 S.E. 633 (1938); Price v. Askins, 212 N.C. 583, 194 S.E.
284 (1937); Brock v. Noecker, 66 N.D. 567, 267 N.W. 656 (1936); Baylor v.
Bath, 189 S.C. 269, 1 S.E. 2d 139 (1939); Seat v. Seat, 172 Tenn. (8 Beeler) 618,
113 S.W. 2d 751 (1938).
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to probate, the probate could be set aside and distribution decreed
in accordance with the prior will."4 The promisee of a valid con-
tract to make a will has been granted an injunction against the
revocation by the promisor of a will made pursuant to the con-
tract,"5 and an injunction has also been allowed against the pro-
bate of a will which, if probated, would have the effect of re-
voking a prior will made pursuant to contract.0 ' A will made
pursuant to contract has been admitted to probate even though
a more recent will purporting to revoke the first was before the
probate court.67 These and other illustrations which could be
cited appear inconsistent with the theory that a will is necessarily
and for all purposes an ambulatory and revocable instrument.
Professor Evans seems to have accepted as too clearly estab-
lished to require discussion the proposition that a will is revocable
only to the extent that the testator has not contracted to make it
irrevocables Professor Goddard takes the same position and
argues that the fact of irrevocability should be recognized in the
probate court. 69 Although usually unnecessary to the decisions,
numerous cases can be found containing language to the effect
that wills may be made irrevocable.70 Frequently a supposed dis-
tinction is made that the will is revocable so far as the probate
court is concerned but is irrevocable in equity.71 Just what this
distinction is expected to accomplish is difficult to determine.
Recognition of the irrevocability of a will in any court or in any
type of proceeding seems to destroy the ambulatory nature of a
will. It is this destruction of the ambulatory character of a will,
wherever and however it is accomplished, that some writers find
" Frazier v. Patterson, 243 IMI. 80, 90 N.E. 216 (1909).
'Cagle v. Justus, 196 Ga. 826, 28 S.E. 2d 255 (1943); Lovett v. Lovett, 87
Ind. App. 42, 155 N.E. 528, rehearing denied, 87 Ind. App. 42, 157 N.E. 104
(1927); see Elmer v. Elmer, 271 Mich. 517, 519, 260 N.W. 759, 760 (1935);
Cobb v. Hanford, 88 Hun 21, 23 (N.Y. 1895); Ex parte Hineline, 166 S.C. 352,
363, 164 S.E. 887, 891 (1932).
Hatcher v. Sawyer, 243 Iowa 858, 52 N.W. 2d 490 (1952); Child v. Smith,
225 Iowa 1205, 282 N.W. 316 (1939); Cobb v. Hanford, 88 Hun 21 (N.Y. 1895).
Contra: Allen v. Bromberg, 147 Ala. 317, 41 So. 771 (1906); In re Martin's
Will, 128 Misc. 659, 220 N.Y. Supp. 398 (Sur. Ct. 1927), noted, 13 VA.. L. Rzv.
660 (1927); Dickerson v. Murfield, 183 Ore. 149, 191 P. 2d 380 (1948).
'Walker v. Yarbrough, 200 Ala. 458, 76 So. 390 (1917).
'Evans, Concerted Wills-A Possible Device for Avoiding the Vidow's Privi-
lege of Renunciation, 33 Ky. L. J. 79 (1945).
Goddard, Mutual Wills, 17 MIcH. L. REv. 677 (1919).
o Rolls v. Allen, 204 Calif. 604, 269 Pac. 450 (1928); Kremar v. Krcmar, 202
Iowa 1166, 211 N.W. 699 (1927); Brown v. Webster, 90 Neb. 591, 134 N.W. 185
(1912); Teske v. Dittberner, 70 Neb. 544, 98 N.W. 57 (1903).
1 WoERNER, AmERICAN LAW OF AD=MNXSTRATION see. 37 (3d ed. 1923).
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too inconsistent with the will's inherent nature to be permitted.72
Much of the difficulty results from a careless use of terms. Dis-
cussions of the problem often ignore the distinction between
rights arising out of contract and rights under a will made pur-
suant to contract. This has been particularly true when the con-
tract and the will are expressed in one document as is often the
case where joint wills are concerned. Writers often speak of the
"right to revoke," apparently meaning rights under the contract,
but using the expression as though applicable to the legal effect
of a will made in compliance with a contract. Thus, Professor
Atkinson makes a clear distinction between contractual rights and
rights under a will, and lays down the definite proposition that
there can be no such thing as an irrevocable will and that there is
no separate legal concept of "will made in pursuance of contract."
After making it clear that he considers a will made pursuant to
contract as freely revocable as any other will, he makes the ap-
parently inappropriate comment that, "Whether the parties [to
mutual wills made pursuant to contract] should be entitled to
revoke during their joint lifetimes should depend upon the con-
tract which was made."73 Likewise Professor Page states that,
"Conveyance by one of the parties [to a joint will] to the other
does not prevent such other from revoking his will, in the absence
of contract."74 Consideration of other parts of Professor Page's
work clearly indicates that he regards a will as being always re-
vocable in spite of any contract to the contrary." His qualifying
phrase, in the absence of contract, used in this instance can be
extremely misleading if uttered out of context.
The language of the decisions concerning contracts to devise
or bequeath is in such hopeless confusion that any attempt to
harmonize it is doomed to failure. An historical study of the legal
relations created by such contracts indicates that most of the dif-
ficulty has been caused by an abortive, unconscious effort con-
' 1 PAGE, WnVLLs sec. 71 (Lifetime ed. 1941); 4 PAGE, WLLs see. 1709 (Life-
time ed. 1941); Eagleton, Joint and Mutual Wils: Mutual Promises to Devise as a
Means of Conveyancing, 15 CoRN. L. Q. 358 (1930); Partridge, The Revocability
of Mutual or Reciprocal Wills, 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 357 (1929); Note, Testa-
mentary Contracts and Irrevocable Wills, 27 YALE L. J. 542 (1918).
"ATKmnsoN, WrLs see. 49 (2d ed. 1953). Of course the intention of the
author here was to discuss whether or not a contractual obligation existed under
certain conditions, not whether or not the will was revocable, but the language
used easily lends itself to misinterpretation.
1 PAGE, Wn.Ls sec. 108 (Lifetime ed. 1941).
1 id. see. 71; 4 id. see. 1709.
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tinuing down through the years to develop a contractual will
concept. No such concept has been developed. There are con-
tracts and there are wills but the law has not yet created any
medium through which the two may be united into one. This is
not to say that the contract to make a will is not a valuable legal
instrument in many instances. On the contrary it is a vehicle
which serves many needs for which no other satisfactory device is
available. It is a means by which the aged can provide for their
own support and maintenance without relinquishing ownership
of their property prior to death. It furnishes a convenient means
of providing care for infant children. The chief element in pre-
nuptial contracts is often a provision for a will. Such provisions
also frequently find their way into separation agreements. Business
partnerships and employer-employee relationships frequently pro-
vide situations where contracts to devise or bequeath are found
convenient. All these and other desirable social interests can be
served without the necessity of attaching to the same transaction
the incidents of both will and contract. The contract creates a
present valuable right in the promisee. The will remains inopera-
tive until the death of the promisor. The attempted fusion of
these two antagonistic ideas pervades much of the learning on
this subject and has often tended toward unnecessary uncertainty.
The will and the contract might possibly be expressed on the same
piece of paper or in some instances the will might serve as evi-
dence of the contract, but a blending of the two concepts is never
proper. A study of the rights and duties of the promisor and
promisee immediately upon the formation of the contract, rights
and duties after the death of the promisor, and the rights of
creditors, spouses, and other third persons must be primarily an
inquiry into the nature of the transaction giving rise to the in-
terests concerned. Uncertainty of results and unnecessary litiga-
tion can be largely eliminated if the problem is analyzed as one
of ascertaining the rights, duties, powers, privileges, and im-
munities created by the contract. The testamentary law can then
be given full effect without diminishing the contractual interests
of the decedent, and many of the difficulties involved will tend to
disappear as it becomes more clearly recognized that the will and
the contract are two entirely separate and distinct concepts,
neither of which is destroyed by its contact with the other.
